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Introduction
A New Deal is necessary for speech, one that would parallel the
New Deal provided to property rights during the 1930s. 1 The goal of
the New Deal should be to promote attention to public issues and
diversity of view, and, in this way, to diminish the influence of money
over the content of broadcasting.
To compress a long story:2 Before the New Deal, the Constitu-
tion was often understood to be a constraint on government "regula-
tion." In practice, this meant that the Constitution often prohibited
governmental interference with existing distributions of rights. From
this pre-New Deal view, existing distributions marked the boundary
not only between neutrality and partisanship, but inaction and action
as well. The rallying cry "laissez-faire" of course captured such ideas.
The fear, and more important, the very concept of government inter-
vention did the same.
The New Deal reformers argued that this entire framework was
built on fictions. Ownership rights were a creation of law. The gov-
ernment did not act only when it disturbed existing distributions. It
was responsible for those distributions in the first instance. What peo-
ple had, in markets, was partly a function of the entitlements that the
law conferred on them. The notion of "laissez-faire" thus stood re-
vealed as a conspicuous myth.
To the reformers, different forms of governmental ordering had
to be evaluated pragmatically and in terms of their consequences for
social efficiency and social justice. Markets would not be identified
with liberty in any a priori way; they would have to be evaluated
through an examination of whether they served liberty or not. This did
not mean that markets would be rejected, for they were often, as they
are today, associated with liberty and productivity, and indeed with a
form of equality. But interferences with markets-which are them-
selves made possible only by law-would be evaluated for what they
did for human beings, and not taken as per se invalid.
Unfortunately, these ideas of the New Deal have played little role
in the law of free speech. That is, for purposes of speech, contempo-
1. Something of this general sort is suggested in Onora O'Neill, Practices of Tolera-
tion, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 155 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990); T.M. Scan-
Ion, Jr., Content Regulation Reconsidered, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 331
(Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal, Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?,
100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1405 (1986).
2. Details can be found in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
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rary understandings of neutrality and partisanship, or action and inac-
tion, are identical to those that predate the New Deal. The category
of government "intervention" is defined accordingly. Status quo neu-
trality dominates the law of free expression.
This is not to say that there is not much good in the contemporary
use of pre-New Deal understandings. Free speech absolutism-even
if it is wildly simplistic, even if it fails to grapple with hard cases, even
if it cannot survive reflection-is an important safeguard against my-
opic or oppressive legislation. Nevertheless, recent First Amendment
controversies in the area of broadcasting confirm the wisdom of the
New Deal and show that American constitutionalism, with respect to
freedom of expression, has failed precisely to the extent that it has not
taken that reformation seriously enough.
I do not mean to suggest that speech rights should be freely sub-
ject to political determination, as are, say, current issues of occupa-
tional safety and health. I do not mean to suggest that markets in
speech are generally abridgements of speech, or that they usually dis-
serve the First Amendment. Nor do I mean to say that government
can favor some views over others, that free speech is a myth, or that
the goal of equality ought to be balanced against the goal of free
speech. But I do mean to say that at a minimum, what seems to be
government regulation of speech might, in some circumstances, pro-
mote free speech, and should not be treated as an abridgement at all.
I mean also to argue, though more hesitantly, that what seems to be
free speech in markets might, on reflection, amount to an abridge-
ment of free speech. Consider here Robert Hale's suggestion, captur-
ing much of my argument, that "the power to set judicial machinery in
motion for the enforcement of legal duties" should "be recognized as
a delegation of state power."3 This recognition-of prime importance
in the area of broadcasting-is precisely what is missing from current
free speech law.
In this regard, however, I must make a general clarification. It
will be tempting to think that the argument to follow amounts to a
broad and perhaps bizarre plea for more regulation of speech. This
might be so because many of the practices and conditions that I will
challenge are commonly taken to involve private action and therefore
are not considered to involve the Constitution at all. (Recall the state
action doctrine, which stands for the proposition that private behavior
3. Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic"
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 197 (1935).
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is not subject to the Constitution.)4 For example, the outcome of the
"market" for expenditures on campaigns and the practices of broad-
casters and managers of newspapers raise no constitutional question
because presumably no state action is involved. What is constitution-
ally problematic, however, is government regulation of the market.
In fact, there should be enthusiastic agreement that the First
Amendment is aimed only at governmental action, and that private
conduct raises no constitutional question. On this point the Constitu-
tion is clear.5 It seems clear, too, that to find a constitutional viola-
tion, one nee.ds to show that governmental action has "abridged the
freedom of speech."6 That action must usually take the form of a law
or regulation.
But if the New Deal is taken at all seriously, it follows that gov-
ernmental rules lie behind the exercise of rights of property, contract,
and tort. This is so especially when the law grants people rights of
exclusive ownership and use of property-and emphatically when the
law grants owners or speakers such rights. But it does not follow from
this that private acts are always subject to constitutional constraint, or
,even that legally-conferred rights of ownership violate any constitu-
tional provision. This is so because to find a constitutional question, it
is always necessary to point to some exercise of public power.7 And to
find a constitutional violation, it is necessary to show that public
power has compromised some constitutional principle.8 But it does
not follow that a claim on behalf of, for example, new efforts to pro-
mote greater quality and diversity in broadcasting is a plea for govern-
ment intervention where none existed before. Instead, it is a claim for
a new regulatory system.
What I want to suggest first and foremost is that legal rules that
are designed to promote freedom of speech and that interfere with
other legal rules (e.g, the law of property) should not be invalidated if
their purposes and effects are constitutionally valid.9 In fact, it may
follow that some existing rules may themselves be subject to constitu-
tional objection, and in some surprising places, if and when such rules
4. See generally Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 927 (1982); Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
5. See generally Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
6. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
7. See the "public functions" line of cases beginning with Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536 (1927).
8. Id.
9. This is a complex question that I will take up below. See infra text accompanying
notes 20-22.
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"abridge the freedom of speech" by preventing people from speaking
at certain times and in certain places.
I
Speech and the Pre-New Deal Understanding
While these remarks may seem uncomfortably abstract or uncon-
ventional, they have a clear foundation in no lesser place than New
York Times Company v. Sullivan,10 one of the defining cases of mod-
ern free speech law. The Sullivan Court concluded that a public offi-
cial could not bring an action for libel unless he could show "actual
malice," that is, knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, the falsity of
the statements at issue.1 Sullivan is usually taken as the symbol of
broad press immunity for criticism of public officials. Even more, Sul-
livan is often understood to reflect the conception of freedom of ex-
pression advocated by Alexander Meiklejohn-a conception of self-
government connected to the American principle of sovereignty.
12
What is striking about Sullivan, however, is that the lower court
held that the common law of tort, and more particularly libel, was not
state action at all, and was therefore entirely immune from constitu-
tional constraint. 3 A civil action, according to the lower court's view,
involved a purely private dispute. The Supreme Court quickly dis-
posed of this objection, as seems obviously right. The Court's ration-
ale was that the use of public tribunals to punish speech is
conspicuously state action.14 What is interesting is not the Supreme
Court's rejection of the no state action argument, but the fact that
such an argument could be made by a state supreme court as late as
the 1960s. How could reasonable judges perceive the rules of tort law
as purely private?
The answer lies in the persistence of pre-New Deal understand-
ings in which the common law simply implements existing rights, or
private desires, and does not amount to "intervention" or "action" at
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. Id. at 267.
12. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT 14-19 (1948). The link is made explicitly in William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1965).
13. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 (Ala. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). It is notable here that in Sullivan, the government was not a party-something that
distinguishes the case from most others in which First Amendment objections had been
raised. But to see this as meaning that there is no state action is simply another version of
the problem discussed in the text.
14. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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all.' 5 The view that the common law of property should be taken as
prepolitical and just, and as a refusal to use government power-the
view that the New Deal repudiated-was the same as the view of the
state supreme court in Sullivan. Reputation is of course a property
interest,16 and just as in the pre-New Deal era, the protection of that
interest did not appear to involve government action at all.
The Supreme Court's rejection of that claim seemed inevitable in
Sullivan itself, and indeed this aspect of the case is largely forgotten.
But many aspects of current law are based on precisely the same un-
derstandings that underlie the forgotten view of that obscure court. In
fact, we might generalize from Sullivan the broad idea that protection
of property rights, through the law, must always be assessed pragmati-
cally in terms of its effects on speech. This idea has major implica-
tions. In a regime of property rights, there is no such thing as no
regulation of speech; the question is, what forms of regulation best
serve the purposes of the free speech guarantee?
Consider, for example, the issues raised when people claim a
right of access to the media, or seek controls on broadcasting in gen-
eral. May broadcasters be required to be common carriers of local
programming, as the 1992 Cable Act says?17 Suppose that most
broadcasters deal little or not at all with issues of public importance,
restricting themselves to stories about movie stars or sex scandals.
Suppose, too, that there is no diversity of view on the airwaves, but
instead a bland, watered-down version of conventional morality.
What this suggests is that a large part of the problem for the sys-
tem of free expression is the governmental grant of legal protection-
rights of exclusive use-to institutions having huge resources with
which to provide communication. 8 This grant of power-sometimes
through the common law, sometimes through statute-is usually
taken not to be a grant of power at all, but instead to be purely "pri-
vate." Thus the exclusion of people and views from the airwaves is
immunized from constitutional constraint on the theory that the act of
15. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
16. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
17. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (specifi-
cally 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV 1992)).
18. At least this is so if we assess our system of free expression by reference to two
original constitutional goals: promotion of attention to public issues and opportunity to
speak for diverse views. I take up the issue of scarcity and its demise below. See infra text
accompanying notes 31-37.
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exclusion is purely private; thus rights of access to the media are
thought to involve governmental intervention into the private sphere.
It might be helpful in this regard to consider that in Sullivan, the
Supreme Court said, as against a similar claim, that legal rules should
be inspected for their conformity with the overriding principle that
government may not restrict freedoms of speech and press: "The test
is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."' 9
We might apply this understanding to current problems. If the
First Amendment is regarded as an effort to ensure that people are
not prevented from speaking, especially on issues of public impor-
tance, then the commitments that currently dominate free speech law
seem ill-adapted to current conditions. Above all, the concept of gov-
ernment regulation turns out to misstate important issues and some-
times to disserve the goal of free expression itself. With broadcasting,
the form of the exclusion is rights of exclusion that prevent certain
people from speaking, and that do so through law.
Consider a case in which a network decides not to sell advertising
time to a group that wants to discuss some public issue or to express
some dissident view. Under current law, the refusal raises no First
Amendment question, in part because a number of the justices-per-
haps now a majority-believe that there is no state action. 20 But
broadcasters are given property rights in their licenses by government,
and the grant of such rights is unambiguously state action. To be sure,
it is generally good to have a system in which government creates
ownership rights or markets in speech, just as it is usually good to
create rights of ownership, and markets, in property. But the key
point is that a right of exclusive ownership in a television network is
governmentally conferred; the exclusion of the would-be speakers is
backed up, or made possible, by the law of (among other things) civil
and criminal trespass. It is thus a product of a governmental decision.
A system in which only certain views are expressed or made
available to most of the public is a creation of law. The constitutional
question is whether reforms eliminating exclusive ownership rights-
or, more precisely, reforms eliminating an element of such rights by
conditioning the original grant, perhaps by creating common carrier
obligations-are consistent with the First Amendment. Or, to put it
another way, the question is whether the government grant of exclu-
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 316 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
20. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973). There only
three Justices said that there was no state action. But those three Justices may now repre-
sent the majority view. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978).
1994]
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sive ownership rights violates the First Amendment. We cannot an-
swer such questions merely by saying that ownership rights are
governmental. We need to know the purposes and effects of the
grant. That question cannot be answered a priori, or in the abstract.
We need to know a lot of details.
A tempting response to these questions might be that the Consti-
tution creates "negative" rights rather than "positive" ones, or at least
that the First Amendment is negative in character-a right to protec-
tion from the government, not a right to help from the government.
So stated, the claim certainly captures the conventional wisdom. Any
argument for a New Deal for speech must come to terms with the
view that the Constitution does not create positive rights and should
not be understood to do so.
There are two replies to this view. The first and most fundamen-
tal is that no one is asserting a positive right in these cases. Instead
the claim is that government sometimes cannot adopt a legal rule that
imposes a (negative) constraint on those who can speak and where
they can do so. When someone with view X is unable to state that
view on certain stations, it is because the civil and criminal law prohib-
its him from doing so. Negative liberty is indeed involved.
This is the same problem that underlies a wide range of familiar
constitutional claims; consider a ban on door-to-door soliciting. An
attack on content-neutral restrictions of this kind is not an argument
for positive government protection. It is merely a claim that legal
rules that stop certain people from speaking in certain places must be
reviewed under First Amendment principles. In fact, the response
that a New Deal for speech would create a positive right trades on
untenable, pre-New Deal distinctions between positive and negative
rights.
2 1
The second point is that the distinction between negative and
positive rights fails even to explain current First Amendment law.
There are two obvious counter examples. The Supreme Court has
come very close to saying that when an audience becomes hostile and
threatening, the government is obligated to protect the speaker.
Under current law, reasonable crowd control measures are probably
constitutionally compelled, even if the result is to require a number of
21. To say this is not to say that the distinction itself is untenable. We can understand
a positive right as one that requires for its existence some act by government, and a nega-
tive right as one that amounts merely to an objection to some such act. There is nothing
incoherent about this distinction. The argument in text is directed against the view that an
objection to rights of exclusive ownership is a call for a positive right; in fact that objection
is mounted against something that government is actually doing.
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police officers to come to the scene.22 The right to speak thus includes
a positive right to governmental protection against a hostile private
audience.
Or return to the area of libel. By imposing constitutional re-
straints on the common law of libel, the Court has held, in effect, that
those who are defamed must subsidize speakers by allowing their rep-
utation to be sacrificed to the end of broad diversity of speech. Even
more than this, the Court has held that government is under what
might be seen as an affirmative duty to "take" the reputation of peo-
ple who are defamed in order to promote the interest in free speech.
The First Amendment requires a compulsory, governmentally pro-
duced subsidy of personal reputation for the benefit of speech.2 3
Cases of this sort reveal that the First Amendment, even as cur-
rently conceived, is no mere negative right. It has positive dimensions
as well. Those positive dimensions consist of a command to govern-
ment to take steps to ensure that the system of free expression is not
violated by legal rules giving too much authority to private persons.
In the hostile audience case, government is obliged to protect the
speaker against private silencing; in the libel cases, government is
obliged to do the same thing, that is, to provide an extra breathing
space for speech even though one of the consequences is to infringe
on the common law interest in reputation.
In any case, a constitutional question might well be raised by a
broadcasting system in which government confers on all stations the
right to exclude certain points of view. In principle, the creation of
that right is parallel to the grant of a right to a hostile audience to
silence a controversial speaker, subject only to the speaker's power of
self-help through the marketplace (including the hiring of private po-
lice forces). In the hostile audience setting, it is insufficient to say that
any intrusion on the speaker is private rather than governmental. It is
necessary instead to evaluate the consequences of the system by refer-
ence to the purposes of the First Amendment-just as it is necessary
22. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 231-33 (1963); Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1951). See also Scanlon, supra note 1, at 338-39; Fiss,
supra note 1, at 1416-19 (both discussing this point).
23. A qualification is necessary here. To decide whether there is a subsidy, one always
needs a baseline. To see reputation as part of the initial set of endowments is to proceed
under the common law baseline. The social contract version of this idea (the state must
protect certain rights in return for the decision of citizens to leave the state of nature)
might support it. But it would of course be possible to say that on the right theory, people
do not have such a right to reputation, and that therefore no subsidy is involved in the libel
cases.
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to evaluate the consequences of any system in which property rights
operate to hurt some and benefit others.
None of this demonstrates that the creation of property rights in
broadcasting fails to produce broad diversity of views and an opportu-
nity to speak for opposing sides. Especially in a period without much
scarcity, we might expect a great deal of diversity and a great deal of
attention to public issues. If we have these things, the market system
created by law is constitutionally unobjectionable. But it is surely im-
aginable that a market system will have less fortunate consequences.
We might look in this connection at the Court's remarkable opin-
ion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.24 There the Court upheld
the fairness doctrine, which required attention to public issues and a
chance to speak for opposing views. (At least it required these in the-
ory; it was rarely enforced in practice.25 ) In Red Lion Broadcasting,
the Court actually seemed to suggest that the doctrine was constitu-
tionally compelled. According to the Court,' the fairness doctrine
would "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and
press,"26 for free expression would be disserved by "unlimited private
censorship operating in a medium not open to all."'27 The Court sug-
gested that
as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed
stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license
permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to
be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency
to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a li-
censee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.28
Thus the Court emphasized that
the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio
and their collective right to have the medium function consistently
with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. It is
the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial
24. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
25. See ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS 104-06 (1989).
26. Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 375.
27. Id. at 392.
28. Id. at 389.
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here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by
Congress or by the FCC.2 9
Compare this suggestion from the head of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) in the 1960s: "It was time to move away
from thinking about broadcasters as trustees. It was time to treat
them the way almost everyone else in society does-that is, as busi-
nesses .... [T]elevision is just another appliance. It's a toaster with
pictures.
30
The Red Lion Broadcasting vision of the First Amendment
stresses not the autonomy of broadcasters (made possible only by cur-
rent ownership rights), but instead the need to promote democratic
self-government by ensuring that people are presented with a broad
range of views about public issues. I do not mean to defend the fair-
ness doctrine itself, about which we need not be enthusiastic. But in a
market system, basic democratic goals may be compromised. It. is
hardly clear that "the freedom of speech" is promoted by a regime in
which people are permitted to speak if and only if other people are
willing to pay enough to allow them to be heard.
II
Practice
A core insight of Red Lion Broadcasting is that the interest in
private autonomy from government is not always the same as the in-
terest in free speech through democratic self-governance. To immu-
nize broadcasters from legal control may not promote quality and
diversity in broadcasting. In fact, it may be inconsistent with the First
Amendment's own commitments. The question, then, is what sorts of
regulatory strategies have the most beneficial effects for the system of
free expression.
We might be able to generate a First Amendment "New Deal"
with proposals for legal reform. Begin with the fact that for much of
its history, the FCC has imposed on broadcast licensees the so-called
"fairness doctrine." As noted, the fairness doctrine requires licensees
to spend some time on issues of public importance, and it creates an
obligation to allow access by people of diverse views.
The last decade, however, has witnessed a mounting constitu-
tional assault on the fairness doctrine. One reason for this is that
licenses are no longer technologically scarce; indeed, there are far
29. Id. at 390 (citations omitted, including a reference to the Brennan article referred
to earlier).
30. Bernard D. Nossiter, The F.C.C.'s Big Giveaway Show, THE NATION, Oct. 26,
1985, at 402 (quoting Mark Fowler, former Chairman of the FCC).
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more radio and television stations than there are major newspapers.
Also, under President Reagan the FCC concluded that the fairness
doctrine violates the First Amendment because it involves an effort,
by government, to tell broadcasters what they may say.31 According
to this view, the fairness doctrine represents a form of impermissible
government intervention into voluntary market interactions. For this
reason, it is a violation of the government's obligation of neutrality
and a reflection of government's respect for market outcomes. Influ-
ential judges and scholars have reached the same conclusion.32
Note, however, that the Constitution forbids any "law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech. '33 Consequently, we must examine
whether the fairness doctrine is such a law. To its defenders, the fair-
ness doctrine promotes "the freedom of speech," by ensuring diversity
of views on the airwaves, diversity that the market may fail to bring
about. In response, the FCC's attack asserts, without a sufficiently full
look at the real-world consequences of different regulatory strategies,
that the doctrine involves governmental interference with an other-
wise purely law-free and voluntary private sphere.34 This response is
far from adequate.
It is possible, however, to adopt a presumption against rigid com-
mand-and-control approaches of the kind exemplified by the fairness
doctrine without thinking that the doctrine or alternatives violates the
First Amendment to the Constitution. Those entrusted with interpret-
ing the Constitution should deal with the fairness doctrine by explor-
ing the relationships between a market in broadcasting, alternative
systems, and the goals, properly characterized, of a system of free
expression.
It seems clear that a market will provide diversity in available
offerings, especially in a period with numerous outlets. So long as the
particular view is supported by market demand, it should find a sup-
plier. The broadcasting status quo is far preferable to a system of cen-
tralized government regulation, at least if such a system sharply
constrains choice. Markets do offer a range of opinions and options.
31. The key decision is In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television
Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043,
5057 (1987), affd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
32. See LucAs A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 214-15 (1987).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
34. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm'ns Rules and Regs. Concerning the
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 147
(1985).
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The enormous expansion of technology means that the number of sta-
tions may be close to infinite for all practical purposes. Perhaps peo-
ple will be able to see whatever they want. A government command-
and-control system, if it restricted diversity of view and attention to
public affairs, would indeed abridge the freedom of speech. Nothing I
have said, or will say, argues in favor of governmental foreclosure of
political speech.
We should therefore distinguish among three possible scenarios.
First, the market might itself be unconstitutional if it produces little
political discussion or little diversity of view. For reasons suggested
below, courts should be cautious here, in part because the issue turns
on complex factual issues not within the competence of judges. Sec-
ond, government regulation of the market might well be upheld, as
against a First Amendment challenge, if the legislature has made a
considered judgment, based on a record, that the particular regulation
will indeed promote free speech goals. (For reasons taken up below,
this judgment may be right even in a period in which scarcity is not a
problem.) Such a judgment is least objectionable if there is a problem
of monopoly. Third, regulation of the market might be invalidated if
it discriminates against certain viewpoints, or if it is demonstrated that
the regulation actually diminishes attention to public affairs or dimin-
ishes diversity of view. On this latter, highly factual question, the leg-
islature is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.35
A market will of course make it unnecessary for government offi-
cials to oversee the content of speech in order to assess its value. The
fact that a market removes official oversight surely counts strongly in
its favor. The restrictions of the market are content-neutral, in the
sense that the content of the speech is not directly relevant to the
application of property law. But the restrictions of the fairness doc-
trine, or any similar alternative, are content-based in the sense that
any such doctrine would have to be applied with government atten-
tion to the content of the speech.
On the other hand, a market in communications could create
many problems. Take first the case of a natural monopoly. If cable
companies have a natural monopoly-a complex question-govern-
ment "access rights" might well be justified on the simple ground of
ensuring an outcome closer to that which would be provided by a
well-functioning competitive system. The problem of "bottleneck
control" over access suggests that the Supreme Court should uphold
must-carry, at least if these rules can be shown to help ensure access
35. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).
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to free programming. 36 Those rules are viewpoint-neutral; they do not
favor any particular standpoint. More generally, the Court lacks the
expertise to second-guess a plausible legislative judgment that a natu-
ral monopoly exists, even if that judgment is ultimately wrong. (Of
course an implausible legislative judgment would be invalid.) If, then,
we have a reasonable legislative judgment of monopoly, and a view-
point-neutral response, there should be no constitutional difficulty.
Suppose, however, that there is no monopoly, but instead a prop-
erty rights regime with a well-functioning competitive system. Even
under these circumstances, the constitutional issue would not be at an
end. A system of competitive markets is not ordained by the First
Amendment to the Constitution.37 Imagine, for example, if someone
proposed that the right to speak should be given to those people to
whom other people were willing to pay enough to qualify them to be
heard. Suppose, in other words, that the allocation of speech rights
was decided through a pricing system, like the allocation of soap, or
cars, or candy. It would follow that people would be prevented from
speaking if other people were not willing to pay enough to entitle
them to speak.
Surely this would be a strange parody of democratic aspirations-
the stuff of science fiction, rather than self-government. It would be
especially perverse insofar as it would ensure that dissident speech-
expression for which people are often willing to pay-would be fore-
closed. But in many respects, this is precisely what a competitive sys-
tem would produce, and indeed it is the system we now have to the
extent that it is competitive. Broadcasting licenses and speech oppor-
tunities are allocated very much on the basis of private willingness to
pay.
In one respect our current system is even worse, for programming
content is produced not merely by consumer demand, but also by the
desires of advertisers. Viewers are in this way the product as well as
its users. This introduces some large additional distortions. In any
case, First Amendment issues must depend in part on the details.
III
Some Facts
Much information has now been compiled on local news, which
began, incidentally, as a direct response to the FCC's fairness doc-
36. Must-carry rules are codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.57, -.59, -.61 (1984). For a general
discussion of must-carry, see Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, YALE
L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1995).
37. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIorrs REVOLUTION 113 (1992).
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trine. In fact, very little of local news is devoted to genuine news.
Instead it deals largely with stories about movies and television and
with sensationalized disasters of little general interest. "The search
for emotion-packed reports with mass appeal has led local television
news to give extensive coverage to tragedies like murders, deaths in
fires, or plane crashes, in which they often interview survivors of vic-
tims about 'how they feel."'3
During a half-hour of news, no more than eight to twelve minutes
involves news at all.39 Each story that does involve news typically
ranges from twenty to thirty seconds.' Even the news stories tend
not to involve issues of government and policy, but instead focus on
fires, accidents, and crimes. Government stories are further de-em-
phasized during the more popular evening show. And even coverage
of government tends to emphasize not the content of relevant policies,
but instead sensational and often misleading "human impact" anec-
dotes. In addition, there has been greater emphasis on "features"-
dealing with popular actors, or entertainment shows, or even stories
focussing on the movie immediately preceding the news. Economic
pressures seem to be pushing local news in this direction even when
reporters would prefer to deal with public issues in a more serious
way.
4 1
With respect to network news, the pattern is similar. In 1988, al-
most sixty percent of the national campaign coverage involved "horse
race" issues-who was winning, who has momentum-while only
about thirty percent involved issues and qualifications.42 In the crucial
period from January to June 1980, there were about 450 minutes of
campaign coverage, of which no less than 308 minutes dealt with the
"horse race" issues.
43
It is notable in this regard that for presidential candidates, the
average block of uninterrupted speech fell from 42.3 seconds in 1968
to only 9.8 seconds in 1988."4 A statement of more than ten seconds is
therefore unlikely to find its way onto the major networks. There is
little sustained coverage of the substance of candidate speeches. In-
stead, attention is placed on how various people are doing.
38. PHYLLIS C. KANISS, MAKING LOCAL NEWS 110 (1991).
39. Id. at 111.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 46-70.
42. Id. at 114.
43. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 63 (1991).
44. Jon Margolis, Politicians Bypass Press, Go Straight to Voters, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28,
1994, at 1.
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There has been an increase as well in stories about television and
movies, and a decrease in attention to public questions.45 In 1988,
there was an average of thirty-eight minutes per month of coverage of
arts and entertainment news; in the first half of 1990, the average was
sixty-eight minutes per month.46 According to one person involved in
the industry, "By the necessity of shrinking ratings, the network news
departments have had to, if not formally then informally, redefine
what is news."'' 4  According to the Executive Producer of NBC's
Nightly News,
[a] lot of what we used to do is report on the back and forth of
where we stood against the Russians. But there is no back and forth
anymore. I mean nobody is talking about the bomb, so you have to
fill the time with the things people ARE talking about.
4X
Note the problem of circularity here: What people are talking about
is in part of function of what sorts of things are presented on the pop-
ular media.
There is evidence as well of advertiser influence over program-
ming content, though at the moment the evidence is largely anecdo-
tal.4 9 No conspiracy theory will have plausibility. But some recent
events are disturbing. There are reports, for example, that advertisers
are having a large impact on local news programs, especially with re-
spect to consumer reports. In Minneapolis, a local car dealer re-
sponded to a story involving consumer problems with his company by
pulling more than one million dollars in advertisements.5 0 He said:
"We vote with our dollars. If I'm out trying to tell a good story and
paying $3000 for 30 seconds, and someone's calling me names, I'm not
going to be happy."51 Consumer reporters have increasingly pointed
to a need for self-censorship. According to one, "We don't even
bother with most auto-related stories anymore."52 According to an-
other, "I won't do the car repair story, or the lemon story .... It's not
worth the hassle.
53
Educational programming for children sometimes cannot acquire
sponsors. It is for this reason that such programming can be found'
45. J. Max Robins, Nets' Newscasts Increase Coverage of Entertainment, VARIETY, July
18, 1990, at 3, 63.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 63.
49. The best discussion is C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 2097 (1992).
50. Steven Waldman, Consumer News Blues: Are Advertisers Stifling Local TV Re-
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mostly on PBS.5 4 A revealing recent episode involved the effort by
Turner Broadcasting Systems (TBS) and the Audubon Society to pro-
duce a program dealing with the "spotted owl" controversy between
loggers and environmentalists in the Pacific Northwest. Believing that
the program was biased, members of the logging community did not
want it to be aired; all of the eight advertisers (including Ford, Cit-
icorp, Exxon, and Sears) pulled their sponsorship of the program.
TBS aired the program in any event, but was forced to lose the
$100,000 spent on production.55 NBC had severe difficulties in finding
sponsors for its television movie, "Roe v. Wade." Fearful of boycotts
by religious groups, hundreds of sponsors solicited by NBC refused to
participate.56 It seems highly unlikely that advertisers could be found
for any program adopting a "pro-life" or "pro-choice" perspective.
We might look as well at children's television. On ordinary com-
mercial networks, high-quality television for children has been practi-
cally unavailable. Instead children's television has been designed
largely to capture attention and to sell products. In the 1960s, the
FCC issued recommendations and policy statements calling for "pro-
gramming in the interest of the public" rather than "programming in
the interest of salability. '57 In 1974, it concluded that "broadcasters
have a special obligation to serve children, 58 and thus pressured the
industry to adopt codes calling for educational and informational pro-
grams. In 1984, the new FCC Chair, Mark Fowler, rejected this
approach.59
Shortly thereafter, network programming for children dramati-
cally decreased, and programs based on products took its place.6°
Thus, children's television became "a listless by-product of an ex-
54. Children and Television: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions, Consumer Protection, and Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1983) (statements of
Bruce Christenson, President of the National Association of Public Television Stations).
55. Advertisers Drop Program About the Timber Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1989,
at 32.
56. Verne Gay, NBC v. Sponsors v. Wildman Re: Telepic 'Roe v. Wade,' VARIETY,
May 10, 1989, at 71, 82.
57. See Tom Engelhardt, The Shortcake Strategy, in WATCHING TELEVISION 75 (Todd
Gitlin ed., 1986).
58. In re Petition of Action for Children's Television for Rulemaking Looking Toward
the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming and
the Establishment of a Weekly 14-Hour Quota of Children's Television Programs, Report
and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1974), recon. denied, 55 F.C.C.2d 691 (1975), affd
sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59. In re Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Report and
Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 644-45 (1984), affd sub nom. Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
60. See Henry John Uscinski, Comment, Deregulating Commercial Television: Will the
Marketplace Watch Out for Children?, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 141, 142 n.14 (1984).
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traordinary explosion of entrepreneurial life forces taking place else-
where-in the business of creating and marketing toys."'" In 1983,
cartoons based on licensed characters accounted for fourteen pro-
grams; by 1985, the number rose to over forty.62 It has increased
since.
63
Most of the resulting shows are quite violent, and the violence
increased in the period after deregulation. Statistical measures will of
course be inadequate, but it is at least revealing that before 1980,
there were 18.6 violent acts per hour for children's programs, whereas
after 1980, the number increased to 26.4 acts per hour.' Children's
daytime weekend programs, have been consistently more violent than
prime-time shows. Few of these shows have educational content.
More generally, there is a high level of violence on television.65
Seven of ten prime time programs depict violence; during prime time
in 1980, there was an average of between five and six violent acts per
hour. By 1989, the number increased to 9.5 acts per hour. In 1980,
ten shows depicted an average of more than ten acts of violence per
hour; by 1989, the number was sixteen; the high mark was in 1985,
with twenty-nine such shows.66 Violence on children's television has
been found to increase children's fear and also to contribute to their
own aggression.67
IV
Potential Correctives-and the First Amendment
Regulatory strategies cannot solve all of these problems. But
they could help with some of them. Some such strategies should not
be treated as abridgements of the freedom of speech.
At this point it might be suggested that in an era of cable televi-
sion, the relevant problems disappear. People can always change the
channel. Some stations even provide public affairs broadcasting
around the clock. Both quality and diversity can be found among the
dazzling array of options made available by modern technology. In
this light, a concern about the broadcasting market might seem to be a
61. Engelhardt, supra note 57, at 68. See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC ED-
UCATION 241-44 (1987) (discussing children's television).
62. See Engelhardt, supra note 57, at 70.
63. Id.
64. For this discussion, see George Gerbner & Nancy Signorielli, Violence Profile 1967
Through 1988-89: Enduring Patterns, BROADCASTING, Dec. 4, 1989.
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id.
67. See Jerome L. Singer et al., Family Patterns and Television Viewing as Predictors of
Children's Beliefs and Aggression, 34 J. COMM. 73, 87-88 (1984).
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puzzling, even bizarre rejection of freedom of choice. Ought not gov-
ernment foreclosure of expressive options be thought to infringe on
freedom of speech?
There are several answers. First, and most simply, we may have a
situation of natural monopoly or "bottleneck control" over stations, at
least with respect to cable. If government is responding to such a situ-
ation in a viewpoint-neutral manner, usually there should be no con-
stitutional problem.
Second, information about public affairs has many of the charac-
teristics of a "public good," like national defense or clean air.6 8 It is
well-known that if we rely entirely on markets, we will have insuffi-
cient national defense and excessively dirty air. The reason is that
both defense and clean air cannot be feasibly provided to one person
without simultaneously being provided to many or all. In these cir-
cumstances, each person has inadequate incentives to seek, or to pay
for, the right level of national defense or clean air. Acting individu-
ally, each person will "free ride" on the efforts of others. No producer
will have the right incentives. The result will be unacceptably low
levels of the relevant goods.6 9
Much the same is true of information, especially with respect to
public affairs. The benefits of a broad public debate, yielding large
quantities of information, accrue simultaneously to many or all peo-
ple.7" Once information is provided to one person, or to some of
them, it is also provided to many others too, or it can be so provided
at minimal cost. The production of information for one or some per-
son thus yields large additional benefits for other people as well.
But-and this is the key point-the market provides no mechanism to
ensure that these benefits will be adequately taken into account by
those who produce the information, in this case the newspaper and
broadcasting industries.
At the same time, the benefits of informing one person-of mak-
ing him an effective citizen-are likely to accrue to many other people
as well, through that person's contribution to multiple conversations
and to political processes in general. But these additional benefits, for
each person, will not be taken into account in individual consumption
choices.
68. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558-62 (1991). Information is not a pure public good,
for it is often feasible to provide it to those who pay for it, and copyright and patent laws
can guarantee appropriate incentives for its production. But it does have much in common




Because of the "public good" features of information, no single
person has sufficient incentive to "pay" for the benefits that he re-
ceives. The result will be that the market will produce too little infor-
mation. Reliance on free markets in information will therefore have
some of the same problems as reliance on markets for national de-
fense or environmental protection. For this reason, a regulatory solu-
tion to the public good problem might be justified.7'
So much for the public good issue. The third problem with reli-
ance on the large number of outlets is that sheer numbers do not ex-
plain why there is a constitutional objection to democratic efforts to
increase quality and diversity by ensuring better programming on indi-
vidual stations. Even with a large number of stations, there is far less
quality and diversity than there might be. Of course people can
change the channel. But why should the Constitution bar a demo-
cratic decision to experiment with new methods for achieving their
democratic goals?
Fourth, it is important to be extremely cautious about the use, for
constitutional and political purposes, of the notion of consumer sover-
eignty. Consumer sovereignty is the conventional economic term for
the virtues of a free market, in which goods are allocated through con-
sumer choices, and these goods are measured by how much people are
willing to pay for things. Those who invoke the notion of free choice
in markets are really insisting on consumer sovereignty. But
Madison's conception of "sovereignty" is the relevant one.72 That
conception has an altogether different character.
In the Madisonian view, sovereignty entails respect not for pri-
vate consumption choices, but for the considered judgments of a dem-
71. It might be thought that the distinctive characteristics of the broadcasting market
provide at least a partial solution. Because advertisers attempt to ensure a large audience,
viewers are commodities as well as, or instead of, consumers. In these circumstances, it is
not as if individual people are purchasing individual pieces of information. Instead, adver-
tisers are aggregating individual preferences in seeking popular programming and, in that
sense, helping to overcome the collective action problem.
The problem with this response is that the advertisers' desire to attract large audiences
does not adequately serve the goal of overcoming the public good problem with respect to
information about public affairs. A program with a large audience may not be providing
information at all; consider most of network television. As we have seen, advertisers may
even be hostile to the provision of the relevant information. Their economic interests
often argue against sponsorship of public service or controversial programming, especially
if the audience is relatively small, but sometimes even if it is large. The external benefits of
widely-diffused information about politics are thus not captured in a broadcasting market.
The peculiarities of the broadcasting market do overcome a kind of collective action prob-
lem by providing a system for aggregating preferences, but they do not overcome the cru-
cial difficulty.
72. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 14-16.
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ocratic polity. In a democracy, laws frequently reflect those
judgments, or what might be described as the aspirations of the public
as a whole. Those aspirations can and often do call for markets them-
selves. But they might also call for intrusions on markets-a familiar
phenomenon in such areas as environmental law, protection of endan-
gered species, social security, and antidiscrimination law. Democratic
liberty, then, should not be identified with "consumer sovereignty."
And in the context at hand, the people, acting through their elected
representatives, might well decide that democratic liberty is more val-
uable than consumer sovereignty.
Finally, private broadcasting selections are a product of prefer-
ences that are a result of the broadcasting status quo, and not in-
dependent of it. In a world that provides the existing fare, it would be
unsurprising if people generally preferred to see what they are accus-
tomed to seeing. They have not been provided with the opportunities
of a better system. When this is so, the broadcasting status quo can-
not, without circularity, be justified by reference to preferences. Pref-
erences that have adapted to an objectionable system cannot justify
that system. If better options are put more regularly in view, it might
well be expected that at least some people would be educated as a
result. They might be more favorably disposed toward programming
dealing with public issues in a serious way.
It is tempting but inadequate to object that this is a form of "pa-
ternalism" unjustifiably overriding private choices. If private choice is
a product of existing options, and in that sense of law, the inclusion of
better options, through new law, does not displace a freely produced
desire. At least this is so if the new law has a democratic pedigree. In
that case, the people, in their capacity as citizens, are attempting to
implement aspirations that diverge from their consumption choices. I
do not suggest that preferences should be ignored. I do not say that as
a matter of policy, government should disregard preferences for
broadcasting fare. But I do suggest that democratic judgments that
are viewpoint-neutral, but inconsistent with consumption choices,
should not be per se invalid under the Constitution, so long as they
are based on a plausible record and represent an effort to promote
attention to public issues or diversity of view.
For those skeptical about such arguments, it may be useful to
note that many familiar democratic initiatives are justified on pre-
cisely these grounds. As against the two-term rule for the president, it
is hardly decisive that voters can reject the two-term president in indi-
vidual cases if they choose. The whole point of the rule is to reflect a
precommitment strategy. And to those who continue to be skeptical,
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it is worthwhile to emphasize that the Constitution is itself a precom-
mitment strategy, and that this strategy includes the First Amendment
itself.
What approaches might emerge from considerations of this sort?
Here we should be frankly experimental. Flexible solutions, supple-
menting market arrangements, should be presumed preferable to gov-
ernment command-and-control.73  In circumstances of natural
monopoly or "bottleneck control," must-carry rules are unobjection-
able, at least insofar as they are designed to promote attention to pub-
lic issues, even if these are local ones. There is also a strong case for
public provision of high-quality programming for children, or for obli-
gations, imposed by government on broadcasters, to provide such pro-
gramming. Regulation of violence on children's television ought not
to be thought objectionable, so long as the regulation is both narrow
and clear.74 The FCC should begin with advice and recommendations,
and hope that these will be sufficient. If self-regulation fails, narrow
and clear guidelines, and even mandates, ought not to be invalid, at
least if they are protective of children. Moreover, the provision of
free media time to candidates would be especially helpful, simultane-
ously providing attention to public affairs and diversity of view, while
overcoming the distorting effects of "soundbites" and financial
pressures.
More generally, government might award "points" to license ap-
plicants who promise to deal with serious questions, or provide public
affairs broadcasting even if unsupported by market demand. A point
system might well be adapted as a more flexible means of promoting
the policies of the "must-carry" rules. Or government might require
purely commercial stations to provide financial subsidies to public tel-
evision, or to commercial stations that agree to provide less profitable
but high quality programming. It is worthwhile to consider more dra-
matic approaches as well-such as rights of reply, reductions in adver-
tising on children's television, content review of such television by
nonpartisan experts, or guidelines to encourage attention to public is-
sues and diversity of view.
Of course there will be room for discretion, and abuse, in making
decisions about quality and public affairs. There is thus a legitimate
concern that any governmental supervision of the sort I have outlined
would pose risks more severe than those of the status quo. The mar-
73. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992); SUN-
STEIN, supra note 37.
74. Narrow regulation of "indecent" or sexually explicit speech should also be upheld,
though it is not easy to draw up an adequate standard.
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ket, surrounded by existing property rights, will indeed restrict speech.
But at least it does not entail the sort of substantive approval or disap-
proval, or overview of speech content, that would be involved in the
suggested "New Deal." Surely it is plausible to say that the relative
neutrality of the market minimizes the role of public officials in a way
that makes it the best of the various alternatives.
There are two responses. The first is that the current system is
worse than imperfect; it creates extremely serious obstacles to a well-
functioning system of free expression. The absence of continuous
government supervision should not obscure the point. With respect to
attention to public issues, and diversity of view, the status quo badly
disserves democratic goals.
The second point is that it does indeed seem plausible to think
that the key decisions can be made in a nonpartisan way, as indeed is
currently the case for public television. Regulatory policies have
helped greatly in the past. They are responsible for the very creation
of local news.75 They have helped increase the quality of children's
television. Public television, which has a wide range of high quality
fare, needs government help. We have no basis for doubting that
much larger improvements could be brought about in the future. If
the regulatory policies do show bias, or if they fail in practice, they
should be changed or even invalidated.
How might all this bear on the constitutional question? It seems
quite possible that a law that contained regulatory remedies would
promote, rather than undermine, "the freedom of speech," at least if
we understand that phrase in light of the distinctive American contri-
bution to the theory of sovereignty. The current system does not




I have not argued that government should be free to regulate
broadcasting, whether network or cable; however it chooses. There
remain hard policy and legal questions. At the legal level, regulation
designed to eliminate a particular viewpoint would of course be out of
bounds. All viewpoint-discrimination would be banned. Government
could not say that feminists or the religious right must be represented;
it must be neutral on this count. Must-carry rules are neutral in this
75. See KANISS, supra note 38, at 102. I discuss a range of possibilities in Sunstein,
supra note 36.
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way, as is the fairness doctrine. This is a necessary condition for con-
stitutional validity.
Moreover, many viewpoint-neutral but content-based restrictions
would be unacceptable. For one thing, more draconian controls than
those I have described-for example, a requirement of public affairs
broadcasting around the clock-would raise quite serious questions.
For another, some content-based restrictions would suggest illegiti-
mate motivations. Consider a requirement of media attention to the
problem of homelessness, or to the issue of national defense, or to the
problem of AIDS. Requirements of this kind would suggest a govern-
mental effort to focus public attention in its preferred fashion. Such
efforts should not be permitted.
At the policy level, there are serious risks of elitism and futility.
Regulation should not be designed to cater to the interests of a self-
appointed elite with, for example, special interest in classical music or
British television shows. Moreover, any efforts must be monitored for
efficacy. If public affairs programming is required, little will be gained
if people simply change the channel. Aspirational efforts may not
work at all. The possibility of failure is real, and if existing policies do
not succeed, they should be changed.
None of this, however, defeats the case for a New Deal for
speech. At the very least, natural monopoly may be regulated on a
viewpoint-neutral basis. Only slightly more ambitiously, government
may control the power of advertisers over programming content.
Slightly more ambitiously still, government may protect children,
through incentives designed to require high-quality broadcasting and
to diminish violence. My most controversial suggestions involve dem-
ocratic goals-most notably the interest in attention to public issues
and in exposure to diverse views. It is here that I think that common
carrier obligations are least objectionable, because they conform so
closely to some of the basic goals of the First Amendment itself.
Viewpoint-neutral controls on broadcasters, designed to promote
those goals, fit well with the purposes of the free speech guarantee,
however much they might conflict with principles of neoclassical eco-
nomics. It would be most ironic, and most unfortunate, if the First
Amendment itself were to be invoked to prevent experimentation of
this kind.
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